Fairness in risky environments : theory and evidence by VAN KOTEN, Silvester et al.






Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence 
Silvester Van Koten 1,3,*, Andreas Ortmann 2,* and Vitezslav Babicky 1 
1 Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Economics Institute (EI), P.O. Box 882, Politických 
vězňů. 7, 111 21 Prague, Czech Republic; E-Mail: babicky@cerge-ei.cz 
2 Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052, Australia 
3 Department of Institutional Economics, University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic 
* Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed;  
E-Mails: Silvester.VanKoten@cerge-ei.cz (S.V.K.); a.ortmann@unsw.edu.au (A.O.);  
Tel.: +61-2-9385-3345 (A.O.); Fax: +61-2-9313-6337 (A.O.). 
Received: 4 February 2013 / Accepted: 13 May 2013 / Published: 30 May 2013 
 
Abstract: The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality 
aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes 
are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple 
allocation problems—the Dictator and Ultimatum game—we explore whether, and how 
exactly, unknown pie sizes with varying degrees of risk (“endowment risk”) influence 
individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for these games using utility 
functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequity 
aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical predictions using two subject pools: 
students of Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We find that: 
(1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in the Dictator game 
(and also in the Ultimatum game but there not statistically significantly so) in that they 
give more; (2) Using the within-subject feature of our design, and in line with our 
theoretical prediction, varying risk does not influence behavior in the Dictator game, but 
does so in the Ultimatum game (contradicting our theoretical prediction for that game); (3) 
Using the within-subject feature of our design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions 
across games; this is true on the level of individuals as well as in the aggregate. This latter 
finding contradicts the evidence in Blanco et al. (2011); (4) There are no subject-pool 
differences once we control for the elicited risk attitude and demographic variables that  
we collect. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. It has been 
noted, however, that they are closely related in certain choice situations.1 For example, risk-averse and 
inequality-averse choices are indistinguishable in situations where a decision maker picks one 
realization from a set of income distributions, but does not know his position in the distribution (see 
Rawls [1]). This does not, however, imply that they are related in more general choice situations (see 
Chambers [2] for a counter-example). The empirical evidence, though limited, suggests that more  
risk-averse people are also more inequality-averse. In particular, Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos [3] use 
German (non-incentivized) survey data and Carlsson et al. [4] use non-incentivized choices between 
imagined societies and lotteries to show that risk aversion and inequality aversion are positively 
related. The results, however, are most likely affected by the hypothetical nature of the tasks, as it is 
not difficult to be inequality-averse when there are no monetary consequences to making decisions (a 
problem Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos [3] discuss). Experimental evidence also suggests that the degree 
of risk aversion is heavily dependent on the non-hypothetical nature of the task(s), and the scale of 
financial stakes used (e.g., Holt & Laury [5]; Harrison et al. [6]). The relationship between risk 
aversion and inequality aversion would thus be better understood with a properly incentivized 
experiment, where choices explicitly contain tradeoffs between (selfish) utility and fairness (i.e., 
inequality aversion). 
The Dictator game and the Ultimatum game are standard decision situations that feature this 
tradeoff. The theoretic prediction for the Dictator game, under the standard assumption of selfish 
preferences, is zero giving. For the Ultimatum game, the theoretic prediction is zero giving and an 
acceptance threshold of zero or the smallest monetary unit above zero. The experimental evidence, 
however, shows that there is significant giving in both games, and that thresholds are greater than the 
smallest monetary unit in the Ultimatum game. Specifically, transfers to the recipient are about twenty 
percent of the pie size for Dictator games (but see Cherry et al. [7]2), and more than twice of that for 
Ultimatum games (see Camerer [8] and Güth & Ortmann [9]). 
Bolton & Ockenfels [10] and Fehr & Schmidt [11] claim that positive giving and thresholds in 
these kind of game experiments can be explained by incorporating other-regarding preferences such as 
“inequality aversion” (a form of fairness) to subjects’ utility function.3 Greater aversion to inequality 
                                                
1 A reasonable intuition for that finding could be this: encountering states of inequality in the world makes one aware of the 
danger that one self may end up in some such state. This is likely to be the more threatening for a person the more s/he is 
risk-averse. This threat might activate, or intensify, inequality aversion. 
2 Cherry et al. [7] have demonstrated persuasively that the experimental results reported in the literature are dependent on 
both the degree of asset legitimacy and social distance. When the pie was not provided by the experimenter but had to be 
earned by their student dictators first (“asset legitimacy”), and when the game was also played under double anonymity 
(maximal “social distance”; see Hoffman et al. [12]), giving was as predicted by the standard economic assumption of 
selfishness. Bekkers [13] provides similar evidence through a field experiment. Smith [14] argues that asset legitimacy is 
an important challenge that experimental economists need to address. 
3 Engelmann & Strobel [15] presented an experimental test of the Bolton & Ockenfels and Fehr & Schmidt models which 
suggests that people, following Rawls’s theory of justice (Rawls [1]), want to maximize the welfare of the person who is 




corresponds to higher giving in both games, and higher thresholds in Ultimatum games. We can thus 
test the relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion by analyzing subjects’ choices in 
Dictator and Ultimatum games. 
Blanco et al. [20] show that Fehr & Schmidt’s [11] model is relatively accurate in predicting 
choices across different games on the aggregate level, but does poorly on the individual level.4 They 
thus suggest that people’s choices are not consistent across different games. Their study, however, 
does not look at the effects that risk in the environment and risk aversion have on behavior, as Fehr & 
Schmidt’s (and Bolton-Ockenfels’s) [10,11] models were constructed under the assumption that pie 
sizes are known ex ante. The world, however, is rarely known ex ante, and so risk in the environment 
and risk preferences may play an important role in influencing fairness and reciprocity. It therefore 
remains an open question if choices in different games, and for each game under different degrees of 
risk, are consistent. We use a within-subject design to test whether subjects behave consistently under 
different degrees of risk for each game and across games. 
This paper contains three contributions. First, we study the relationship between risk aversion and 
inequality aversion using properly incentivized Dictator and Ultimatum games, with varying degrees 
of risk (“endowment risk”).5 We use a variant of the procedure from Holt & Laury [5] to elicit risk 
preferences, which allow us to compare risk preferences and choices made in the two games. Second, 
we use a within-subject design and the elicited risk preferences to explore whether choices under 
different degrees of risk (within the same game) are consistent. Third, we use the within-subject 
design feature to explore whether choices are consistent across games, conditional on the same degree 
of risk. We derive theoretical predictions for our second and third contribution using Bolton & 
Ockenfels’s [10] ERC model. Assuming constant relative risk aversion, we extend their model and test 
our theoretical predictions for risky environments.  
Our predictions are presented in Section 2. Section 3 contains our experimental design and 
implementation. In Section 4, we summarize our data and results. In Section 5, we discuss our findings 
                                                                                                                                                                
the worst off (a form of other-regarding behavior); these authors (see also Engelmann & Strobel [16] for a balanced review 
of the literature and Engelmann [17] for an important caveat regarding the appropriate modeling of welfare maximization) 
identify the importance of efficiency concerns (defined as the sum of all payoffs in the game) as an explanatory variable. In 
their theory section, Charness & Rabin [18] use a social welfare criterion, which is defined as a weighted combination of 
minimal payoff (again, a form of other-regarding behavior) and the sum of all payoffs in the game. Cox & Sadiraj [19] 
provide a non-linear generalization of that model. 
4 Recent experimental work conducted in parallel by Güth et al. [21], Cappelen et al. [22], and Krawczyk & Le Lec [23], 
introduce theories or experimental results of distributive choice under risk. Güth et al. [21], continuing the work of 
Brennan et al. [24] and, using a within-subject design and incentive-compatible elicitation of valuations of 16 different 
prospects, find that individuals are self-oriented towards the social allocation of risk and delay and other-regarding with 
respect to expected payoffs. Cappelen et al. [22] use a two-stage dictator game to study to what extent, and under what 
circumstances, ex-ante fairness under risk is robust to ex-post redistribution. Krawzcyk & Le Lec [23] use a within-subject 
design and probabilistic versions of the dictator game that are manipulated along two dimensions (the relative cost of giving 
and the nature of the lottery) to try to tease out the relative merits of outcome-based and intention-based models of fairness 
under risk. All the models mentioned above were constructed under the assumption of pie sizes that are known ex ante. 
5 In addition, we also studied the so-called Trust game in such an environment (see Appendices A.5, A.6, and A.8). 
Assuming self-regarding preferences, the situation for responders in the Trust game is theoretically equivalent to that of 
dictators in a standard Dictator scenario. However, responders in our design and implementation of the Trust game cannot 
infer precisely the proposer’s initial decision (because the amount sent is multiplied by an unknown random factor X), and 
proposers cannot foresee the responders’ reaction. Proposers probably developed beliefs about responders’ behavior, but 
we were not able, given time constraints, to control for these during the experiment. We are therefore not able to 
theoretically derive the effects of risk preferences for proposing and responding in the Trust game and therefore decided 
not to include the Trust game in our analysis. We note that none of the relationships turned out significant for the Trust game. 




and enumerate questions regarding our study. The Appendix contains simulations, an overview of the 
socio-demographic characteristics of our subjects, and a copy of the (translated) instructions and the 
precise sequencing of the scenarios used in the experiment. 
2. Theoretical Predictions for Fairness in Risky Environments 
2.1. Risk Attitude and Inequality Aversion 
In the Dictator game, a dictator decides on the proportion p of an uncertain endowment S to give to 
a (anonymous) recipient. 6 To disambiguate, we call the generic (interactive) decision situation 
“game”, and the different realizations of the endowment S “scenarios”. To determine the relationship 
between risk aversion and inequality aversion, we measure participants’ risk preferences using a task 
inspired by Holt & Laury [5]. The assertion that risk aversion and inequality aversion are positively 
related leads to the following hypothesis: 
• Hypothesis 1D: In the Dictator game, those with higher risk aversion give more than those 
with lower risk aversion, independent of the degree of risk in the environment.  
The relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion can also be tested with an 
Ultimatum game. As in the Dictator game, a proposer decides on the proportion p of an uncertain 
endowment S to give to an (anonymous) recipient. Unlike the Dictator game, the recipient is able to 
reject the proposal (she is thus called the responder). If the responder rejects the proposal, both 
proposer and responder receive zero. Under the assumption of selfishness, standard theory predicts 
that the responder rejects the proposal when her expected utility is lower than the disutility from 
having an unequal distribution. The responder thus sets a threshold for offers (the acceptance 
threshold), below which she rejects them. Responders that are more inequality-averse set higher 
thresholds, independent of the degree of risk in the environment. The assertion that risk aversion and 
inequality aversion are related leads to the following hypothesis:7  
• Hypothesis 1U: In the Ultimatum game, those with higher risk aversion set higher thresholds 
than those with lower risk aversion, independent of the degree of risk in the environment. 
                                                
6 In principle, the recipient’s proposed share can also be determined in absolute terms. There are three reasons why we did 
not use absolute terms. First, in theories of fairness and reciprocity only relative terms matter. Second, an ex-ante 
allocation in absolute terms could result in a negative outcome for the decision maker (when the realized pie is small), 
which might trigger loss aversion and confound our results. Third, in the present paper we are not interested in optimal 
contract design (this could solve the preceding problem, but would also complicate our design beyond what seems feasible 
to implement.) 
7 Note that we have not used the ERC formulation to derive our hypotheses regarding the relation between risk aversion 
and inequality aversion in the Dictator and Ultimatum game, as this formulation is moot on the possible effects of risk 
aversion on inequality aversion. Predictions could be derived for people with different risk preferences, if the inequality 
aversion parameter k could be assumed to remain constant between different people with different risk preferences but with 
equal inequality aversion. This assumption does not hold as the inequality aversion parameter k conveys both an inequality 
aversion and an (unknown) rescaling effect. An increase in risk aversion is modeled by a transformation that results in a 
more concave utility function. This transformation also rescales the magnitude and the slope of the utility function and the 
parameter k needs to change to correct for this rescaling effect, making it impossible to deduce the individual inequality 
aversion effect. For example, using formula (4) below to estimate the parameter k shows that in our sample it ranges from 
an average of 0.2 (for highly risk-averse subjects) to 100 (for somewhat risk-averse subjects) to 5500 (for risk-loving 
subjects). 




For Ultimatum giving decisions we cannot derive predictions from theory as we do not know the 
expectations that givers had about the inequality aversion of the receiver they would be paired with. 
2.2. Consistency within Games 
We extend our analysis by exploiting the within-subject feature of our design (which is explained in 
more detail in Section 3). We derive predictions for within-subject consistency across different 
degrees of risk. Risk is added to the Dictator and Ultimatum games by providing endowments in the 
form of lottery tickets, which represent a mean-preserving spread. This requires the following 
extension of the standard theory of ERC8 [10].  
Let the motivation function ( [ ]v y ) be additively separable in utility ( [ ]u y ) and inequality aversion 
( [ ]k f σ⋅ ): 
[ ] [ ] [ ]v y u y k f σ= − ⋅  (1)  
In Equation (1), y is the absolute payoff of the decision maker, and σ is his relative payoff (i.e., the 
ratio of his absolute payoff to the sum of all payoffs in the interaction). To fulfill the assumptions of 
ERC theory, let u be a continuously increasing concave utility function (i.e., the marginal utility of his 
payoff is decreasing), f be a continuous strictly convex inequality aversion function attaining its 
minimum equal to 0 at 0.5σ =  if n = 2 (i.e., the decision maker’s disutility from his relative payoff is 
minimized when his payoff equals the other player’s payoff), and k > 0. The parameter k quantifies 
how much he cares about his relative payoff. As k approaches 0, he increasingly cares less about his 
relative standing in society and becomes, at the limit, a selfish decision maker whose utility function u 
mimics standard economic theory.  
To increase the precision of our predictions, we introduced additional assumptions about our ERC 
specification. The literature suggests that a utility function in the constant-relative-risk-aversion form 
is a suitable approximation for human behavior.9 We used the simplest form of such a utility function: 
[ ] [ ] ru x Sign r x=  for r≠0, [ ] [ ]u x LN x=  for r = 0. We further assumed that a constant-relative-
inequality-aversion function is a good approximation for fairness preferences: 212[ ] ( )f σ σ= − . 
Substituting these functions into (1), the ERC formula becomes: 
21
2[ ] [ ] ( )
rv y Sign r x k σ= ⋅ − ⋅ −  (2)  





), where r <(>) 1 indicates risk-averse  
(risk-loving) preferences. A dictator who gives proportion p of an ex ante unknown realization of S 
(and thus keeps percentage 1-p) is assumed to have a motivation function given by Equation (2) where 
(1 )p S−  is substituted for x and 1-p for σ: 
21
2[ ] [ ] ((1 ) ) ( )
rv p E Sign r p S k p⎡ ⎤= ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ −⎣ ⎦  (3)  
                                                
8 This can easily be reformulated in terms of Fehr & Schmidt [11]; see Babicky [25]. 
9 For standard stakes (such as the ones in our experiment) the constant-relative-risk-aversion form of the utility function 
can be rationalized experimentally by the results of Holt & Laury [5], p.1652, who suggest that it works as a “good 
approximation” of human behavior. This approximation simplifies our theoretical arguments considerably. 




As S is a random variable, the motivation function is in fact an expected motivation function. 
Taking the non-random terms outside of the expectation operator and differentiating (3) with respect 
to the proportion of giving, p, yields the first-order condition for optimal giving in the Dictator 
scenario:10 
1 1
2[ ] (1 ) [ ] 2 ( )
r rSign r r p E S k p−⋅ − ⋅ = −  (4)  
In the Ultimatum game, a responder evaluates the offer p from the risky endowment S. The 
motivation function of a responder who evaluates the offer p of an ex ante unknown realization of S is 
found by taking the expectation over the right-hand side of (2) and substituting pS for x and p for σ: 
2
2
1 )(])[(][][ pkpSErSignpv r −⋅−⋅=  (2’)  
The responder rejects the offer when her motivation function is negative; that is, when her expected 
utility is lower than the disutility from having an unequal distribution. At the threshold, the lowest 
offer the responder accepts requires the motivation function to equal zero. Rearranging (2’), the 
condition is: 
21
2[ ] [ ] ( )
r rSign r p E S k p⋅ ⋅ = −  (4’)  
Equations (4) and (4’) imply that the level of risk may have an effect on choices in the Dictator and 
Ultimatum games. For subjects with a typical degree of risk aversion, 0 < r < 1, increasing the risk of a 
lottery by a mean-preserving spread, implies [ ] [ ]
r r
H LE S E S< , where SH is the high- and SL the  
low-risk lottery. An increase in risk thus lowers the value of the expected motivation function. This 
makes the left-hand side of Equations (4) and (4’) smaller. For the Dictator (Ultimatum) scenario, 
increasing p can restore the equality as the right-hand can be made arbitrarily small by letting p 
approach ½, while the left-hand side stays bounded below by a strictly positive number for any p ≤ ½. 
The model thus predicts an increase in giving (threshold) when risk is increased. For highly  
risk-averse (r < 0) and risk-loving (r > 1) preferences, the relationship is rather complicated and we 
thus exclude subjects with these preferences.11 
Numerical simulations, however, show that the effect of even a considerable increase in risk should 
result in minor differences in Dictator and Ultimatum game choices.12 Consistency thus requires 
subjects to respond similarly under different levels of risk. We test this for all subjects in our data set 
with a typical degree of risk aversion, 0 < r < 1, and exclude subjects with a degree of risk aversion 
given by r < 0 or r > 1. We thus formulate: 
• Hypothesis 2: For people that have typical risk-averse preferences (0 1r< < ), the risk of the 
endowment does not have a significant effect: 
D. On giving in the Dictator game 
U. On the threshold in the Ultimatum game 
                                                
10 Note that always 1
2
p ≤ . For any c, 120 c< ≤ , any proportion of giving equal to 
1
2
c+  is dominated by 1
2
c− , as the 
latter proportion of giving results in higher utility, u[y], and equal inequality, [ ]f σ . 
11 For risk-loving ( 1>r ) preferences, the relationship is inverted in the Ultimatum game, and depends on the values of k 
and r in the Dictator game. For highly risk-averse ( 0<r ) preferences, the relationship is inverted in the Dictator game 
and undefined in the Ultimatum game. 
12 See Appendix A.3. 




2.3. Consistency across Games 
We also extend our analysis and exploit the within-subject feature of our design by deriving 
predictions for within-subject consistency across games (but keeping the endowment risk constant). 
Following Blanco et al. [20], the analysis is conducted on the aggregate and individual level. We here 
also use as point of departure the theory of ERC and our specification in Section 2.2, Equations (4) 
and (4’) are used to derive the inequality aversion parameter k. Rearranging (4) gives:  
Dictator scenario: 









−  (5)  
Rearranging (4’) gives: 
Ultimatum game: 212











Equation (5) derives k from optimal giving, pD , in the Dictator scenario. Equation (5’) derives k 
from the optimal threshold, pU, in the Ultimatum game. Standard theories of fairness [10,11] assume 
that an individual has constant parameters for inequality aversion k, and risk aversion r, regardless of 
the game. We thus Equations (5) and (5’) to derive Equation (6), which shows giving in the Dictator 













− −  
(6)  
We can then derive prediction intervals for giving choices in the Dictator game from the observed 
threshold choice in the Ultimatum game, and vice versa. As shown in Equation (6), the relationship 
depends on the degree of risk aversion, r. We cannot determine the precise value of the risk aversion 
parameter r using our version of Holt & Laury [5], but we can predict the upper and lower bounds. 
Our predictions thus consist of intervals. We can thus determine if an observed choice in the Dictator 
(Ultimatum) game falls in the prediction interval derived from choices in the Ultimatum (Dictator) 
game. Figure 1 below illustrates our predictions. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between giving in the Dictator game on the x-axis and thresholds in 
the Ultimatum game on the y-axis. The graph shows the predicted choices in the Ultimatum (Dictator) 
game, given the choices in the Dictator (Ultimatum) game. The prediction depends on the risk 
preferences; hence, several lines are drawn in the graph. For example, given some choice in the 
Dictator game, on the x-axis, the corresponding thresholds in the Ultimatum game can be read on the 
y-axis. We can see that highly and very risk-averse people have a low, mostly flat curve, predicting 
low Ultimatum (near 0) thresholds for people who give strictly positive amounts over the typical range 
in the Dictator game. Risk-loving people have a slowly increasing curve that starts at a relative high 
point (0.22). Likewise, the graph can be used to predict Dictator giving, given their threshold choices 
in the Ultimatum game.13 Given the choice in the Ultimatum game, on the y-axis, the choice for giving 
in the Dictator game can be read on the x-axis.  
                                                
13 Note that for certain Ultimatum threshold levels no prediction of positive Dictator giving exists. For example, for Highly 
Risk-averse subjects, an Ultimatum threshold of 0.23 predicts zero Dictator giving. Ultimatum thresholds lower than 0.23 




























Highly Risk-averse  
Relationship between the acceptance threshold in the Ultimatum game and the choice of giving in the 
Dictator game. If one goes from the x-axis to the y-axis, one predicts Ultimatum thresholds from Dictator 
giving choices, and vice versa. 
The relation between Ultimatum thresholds and Dictator giving is non-decreasing, as increases in 
inequality aversion will increase both Dictator giving and threshold in the Ultimatum game. We  
thus formulate: 
• Hypothesis 3: The choices in Dictator game (scenarios) and Ultimatum game (scenarios)  
are consistent. 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
To make hypotheses 1D and 1U experimentally testable, we specified endowments with increasing 
risk (“scenarios”) for Dictator and Ultimatum games. In particular, we provided endowments in the 
form of lottery tickets Si with { , , }i N L H∈ that realized a mean-preserving spread: [ ] 1000iE S = . In 
the low-risk condition, the lottery SL takes the value of 900 or 1100, with ½ probability each. In the 
high-risk condition, the lottery SH takes the value of 300 or 1700, with ½ probability each. In the  
no-risk condition, the lottery SN is fixed at 1000. SH is thus a mean-preserving spread of SL, which is in 
turn a mean-preserving spread of SN. Table 1 summarizes the different endowment risks. 
                                                                                                                                                                
then predict negative Dictator giving, or “Dictator taking”. As Dictator taking was not a choice option in the experiment, 
the 14 observations where the Ultimatum threshold predicts Dictator taking were excluded from the analysis. 




Table 1. Operationalization of endowment risk. 








Dictator - 900 or 1100 300 or 1700 
Ultimatum 1000 900 or 1100 300 or 1700 
We employed two different subject pools: students of the Czech Technical University (CTU) and 
employees of Prague City Hall (CH). The subject pool consisted of 44 CH employees and 116 CTU 
students. 14 Since the two subject pools are different and individual characteristics such as risk 
attitudes play an important role in our theoretical analysis, we controlled for these variables.  
The experiment was conducted at CERGE-EI on a portable experimental laboratory. We conducted 
14 experimental sessions. Table 2 provides an overview of the experimental sessions: 
Table 2. Overview of experimental sessions.15 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total 
Type of 
subjects 
CTU CTU CTU CTU CTU CTU CTU CTU CTUR CTUR CH CH CH CH  
Number 
of subjects 
14 12 16 14 12 16 16 16 16 16 10 8 16 10 192 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree [26]. The experimental instructions were in Czech. The 
experimenter first read descriptions of the four games (see Appendix A.5 and A.8 for the scripted 
instructions and the instructions in the z-Tree program). All subjects then had to correctly answer two 
questions on payoff calculations (see Appendix A.7) before they could proceed to the 17 choices that 
constituted the experiment. All games, and their scenarios, were framed in abstract terms. Five choices 
were about risk aversion (see Holt & Laury [5]; explained in more detail below). The computer 
program randomly selected ex post one of these five choices to be paid out. The twelve remaining 
choices were paid in full. The fully paid choices were the offer and acceptance threshold in the 
Ultimatum game (under no-risk, low-risk and high-risk realizations of the pie size), dictator giving in 
the Dictator game, and investment and return decisions in the Trust game (under low-risk and  
                                                
14 We ran, at the tail end of the CTU sessions, two control sessions with an additional 32 CTU student subjects (sessions 9 
and 10, indicated by CTUR in Table 2). The subjects in the control group read the same instructions but were given a 
different ordering of decisions: all low-risk treatments were switched to high-risk treatments and vice versa. This control 
group, which did not take part in any of the other sessions, was conducted to control for order effects. Two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that the control group differs statistically significantly from the CTU group in at least 
two respects (age and the measure of cognitive ability that we will discuss below). It is not clear to us why we find these 
differences in age and cognitive ability, although it might be due to the fact that we ran those sessions at the tail end of the 
CTU sessions. In addition, using again two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we found the following significant 
differences in the decisions of the control group: they gave less in the Dictator game,  made a lower offer in the Trust 
game, and sent less back in the Trust game. We include the data in our analysis below to determine the extent of the 
estimated treatment effects attributable to decision-order effects with a dummy variable, CTUR. This dummy is not 
significant in any of the regressions in the results section. 
15 Each session contained an even number of participants, and was constrained by the maximum lab capacity of 16 people. 
We attempted to have at least 12 participants in each session but scheduling the four CH sessions turned out to be difficult. 
There is no a-priori reason that we can think of that would suggest this was more than a logistic inconvenience. 




high-risk realizations of the pie size).16 Appendix A.6 contains the order in which these treatments 
were sequenced. No scenario realization was followed by the same scenario realization. We were 
aware that this kind of sequencing could lead to learning effects. Learning effects, however, are 
diminished when subjects are not informed about the outcomes of their decisions until the end of the 
session (e.g., Weber [27]), which is what occurred in our experiment. We thus ignore learning effects. 
Each round random re-matching was used. As mentioned, subjects were informed of the outcomes 
of their decisions in the Dictator and Ultimatum games at the end of a session.17 The exchange rate 
was 1 CZK per 20 experimental currency units (ECU); payoff per subject ranged from 190 CZK to 
620 CZK (payoffs were rounded up to the nearest multiple of ten), and the average payoff was slightly 
below 400 CZK.18 City Hall employees were paid an additional participation bonus of 150 or 200 
CZK, as they had to commute to and from CERGE-EI and because sessions with CH employees lasted 
longer than those with student subjects (recall that the experiment proper started only once all 
participants in the session answered the questionnaire correctly, which on average took longer in the 
CH sessions).19 At the end of each session, we asked all subjects to identify their age and gender, and 
to report their disposable income.  
Since the model predicts that risk aversion influences individual decision making, we  
categorized—as mentioned—all subjects according to their risk aversion through an additional 
scenario (see Scenario Four in the Instructions, in Appendix A.5). Similar to the procedure in Holt & 
Laury [5], subjects had to choose between a series of safer and riskier options. In the first choice, the 
safer option had a higher expected value (EV) than the corresponding riskier one. In the following 
choice, the riskier option had a higher expected value than the corresponding safer one. With every 
choice, the EV of the riskier choice grew faster than the EV of the corresponding safer one (see  
Table 3 below).20 Standard theory predicts that an agent will make at most one switch, if any, across 
the five choices. Since we wanted the decisions to be independent, we did not provide the choices in a 
back-to-back manner, but interspersed them as questions 2, 6, 10, 12, and 16 respectively with the 
other Scenario questions. Table 4 shows the risk aversion interval implied by the number of safe 




                                                
16 Subjects were thus paid twice as recipients in the Dictator game (once for the low-risk and once for the high-risk 
condition). 
17 In the Trust game, subjects were informed of the amount they received once they were asked at the end of a session to 
make a decision as responder. 
18 When the experimental sessions were conducted, the exchange rate was about 23 CZK/1 USD, implying that our 
subjects—not counting appearance fees—earned on average 17–18 USD. The local purchasing power of these payoffs was 
about twice as much. Thus, it seems fair to say that the stakes were considerable for both students and City Hall 
employees. Since CH employees (and students) were told ex ante what average earning they could expect, we believe that 
only subjects that thought the money was worth their troubles signed up for the experiment.  
19 Sessions lasted from 60 to 100 minutes, with student sessions typically being in the lower half and the CH sessions in the 
upper half of the interval. 
20 As in Holt & Laury [5], subjects were not told the expected value of the options they were given.




Table 3. Elicitation of risk aversion. 
  Safer option  EV   Riskier option  EV 
Choice 1: 1000 if n> 40 , 1250 otherwise 1100  60 if n> 40 , 2400 Otherwise 996 
Choice 2: 1000 if n> 50 , 1250 otherwise 1125  60 if n> 50 , 2400 Otherwise 1230 
Choice 3: 1000 if n> 60 , 1250 otherwise 1150  60 if n> 60 , 2400 Otherwise 1464 
Choice 4: 1000 if n> 70 , 1250 otherwise 1175  60 if n> 70 , 2400 Otherwise 1698 
Choice 5: 1000 if n> 80 , 1250 otherwise 1200  60 if n> 80 , 2400 Otherwise 1932 
n is a random number between 1 and 100 and determines the payoff of the chosen option for each of the choices 
Table 4. Implied ranges of risk aversion r. 
Number of 
safe choices 
Range of Relative Risk Aversion r  
for ( )  ( )= rU x Sign r x  
Risk Preference 
Classification 
0 1.15 ∞ Risk-loving 
1 0.86 1.15 Risk-neutral 
2 0.60 0.86 Somewhat Risk-averse 
3 0.33 0.60 Intermediately Risk-averse 
4 0.04 0.33 Very Risk-averse 
5 –∞ 0.04 Highly Risk-averse 
4. Results 
As in Holt & Laury [5], we use the number of safe choices to characterize and measure risk 
aversion in our sample. Only slightly more than half our subjects (52.7% of the CTU and CTUR 
groups, and 54.5% of the CH group, i.e., 78 student subjects and 24 City Hall employees) made 
consistent choices. 21  The risk preferences of subjects that made inconsistent choices is either 
undetermined, or within a very wide range. Since we compare subjects with low and high risk aversion 
in the range of 0 1r< < , we need to determine risk preferences precisely to test our hypotheses. We 
thus excluded inconsistent subjects from our sample in the regressions. Table A1 in Appendix A.1 
shows the implied interval for risk aversion for all patterns of choice. 
To test whether inconsistent subjects are different from consistent subjects, we ran two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on socio-demographic variables. The distribution of inconsistent subjects 
does not differ for the sex and income variables, but differ for the variables Age, Time_to_answer (the 
control questions), and Safe (the number of safe choices) at a statistically (but not necessarily 
otherwise) significant level. On average, inconsistent subjects were 1 day older, took 55 seconds 
longer to answer the control questions, and made 0.9 fewer safe choices than consistent subjects. With 
the possible exception of the number of safe choices, these differences seem inconsequential. 
                                                
21 We were aware ex ante (based, for example, on evidence reported in Hey & Orme [28]) that our procedure was likely to 
induce at least 25% inconsistent choices. Since we did not give our subjects the five risk-aversion measurement choices 
back to back, and did not give our subjects the EV of their options, with the benefit of hindsight, the fairly high percentage 
of inconsistent choices (not observed in the pilots in which we employed CERGE-EI students) is arguably not that 
surprising. It might simply reflect (as does also recent evidence on the stability of risk attitude assessment measures; see 
Dickhaut & Wilcox [29]) that other forms of elicitation may be confounded by subjects’ attempts to be consistent. Harrison 
et al. [30] interpret inconsistent choices as an indication that subjects are indifferent between the different gambles and that 
their risk preference is thus part of a “fatter” interval. 




We note that, on average, Dictator giving is 19%, Ultimatum offers are 43%, and Ultimatum 
thresholds are 26%, which is in line with previous findings in the literature (see Camerer [8] and Güth 
& Ortmann [9]). 
Before analyzing our game data, we characterize the determinants of risk aversion for “consistent” 
subjects through regression analyses. Table 5 shows that socio-demographic characteristics influence 
risk aversion. 
Table 5. Linear regression of risk aversion (defined as the safe choices) on  
socio-demographic variables. 
Variables Effects 
Income –0.11** (0.06) 
Age 0.05 (0.03) 
Female 0.67 * (0.37) 
Time_to_answer  0.06 (0.04) 
City_Hall_employee –0.63 (0.82) 
CTUR 0.07 (0.50) 
Constant 2.23 *** (0.75) 
Both students and City Hall employees are, on average, soundly risk-averse.22 City Hall employees 
are in general less risk-averse than students, but the difference is not significant (p > 0.42).23 Among 
our subjects, a person is predicted to be significantly more risk-averse when s/he earns a lower income  
(p = 0.043) or is female (p = 0.065), which is consistent with the literature (see Harrison &  
Rutström [31]). The variable Time_to_answer (the comprehension questions), which could be 
interpreted as a measure of cognitive ability, is not significant. 
We use linear regression models clustered at the individual level to analyze the game data. We also 
use the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator for the variance (Froot [32]). 
4.1. Risk Attitude and Inequality Aversion (Hypothesis 1: Those with Higher Risk Aversion Show 
Higher Inequality Aversion in Their Responses.) 
Table 6 contains the results of the linear regressions with clustered standard errors models. It 
contains the determinants of the amounts given in the Dictator game and the threshold level in the 
Ultimatum game. We test hypotheses 1D and 1U by regressing the percentage of the amount given in 
the Dictator game and the threshold level in the Ultimatum game on various variables of interest, as 
shown in Table 6. To measure the effect of risk aversion, we include a dummy variable, 
Somewhat_versus_highly_risk_averse, which equals zero for risk-loving and somewhat risk-averse 
                                                
22 The average number of safe choices is 3.5 for students and 3.2 for City Hall employees. This result is not out of line with 
other evidence (e.g., [5]), which suggests the vast majority of subjects are rather risk-averse. Given the considerable stakes 
in our experiment, our risk-attitude results seem sensible. 
23 We ran, as a robustness test, ordered logistic regressions with the number of safe choices as the independent variable: 
Signs are unaffected and the significance levels are roughly the same. The effect of being female, however, is no longer 
significant (p = 0.12). The difference between City Hall employees and students is not significant (p > 0.42). 




subjects (0, 1 or 2 safe choices), and equals one for intermediately and highly risk-averse subjects (3, 4 
and 5 safe choices).24 
Table 6. Linear regression of giving on risk aversion and risk in the Dictator and 






















9.59*** 6.01* 10.49*** 6.91* 5.81 4.68 6.73 5.59 
(3.60) (3.46) (3.92) (3.92) (3.96) (4.08) (4.10) (4.24) 
High_endowment_risk −0.97 −0.97 0.30 0.30 3.71*** 3.71*** 5.40* 5.40* 
 (1.81) (1.83) (3.58) (3.62) (1.24) (1.25) (2.93) (2.95) 
Low_endowment_risk     1.39 1.39 1.63 1.63 





  −1.80 −1.80   −2.40 −2.40 





      −0.34 −0.34 
      (1.77) (1.78) 
Income  −0.00  −0.00  −0.64  −0.64 
  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.51)  (0.51) 
Age  −0.32  −0.32  −0.21  −0.21 
  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
Female  3.81  3.81  −1.95  −1.95 
  (3.65)  (3.66)  (3.52)  (3.53) 
Time_to_answer  1.80***  1.80***  0.61*  0.61* 
  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
City_Hall_employees 8.73* 3.98 8.73* 3.98 −2.93 2.67 −2.93 2.67 
 (4.62) (6.36) (4.63) (6.38) (4.08) (7.08) (4.09) (7.10) 
CTUR −3.87 −6.46 −3.87 −6.46 −4.38 −5.26 −4.38 −5.26 
 (5.16) (4.57) (5.18) (4.58) (4.94) (4.95) (4.96) (4.97) 
Constant 10.55*** 12.70* 9.91*** 12.06* 20.18*** 25.67*** 19.53*** 25.03*** 
 (3.27) (7.45) (3.51) (7.20) (3.71) (7.28) (3.80) (7.28) 
N 204 204   306 306   
(Independent clusters) (102) (102) 204 204 (102) (102) 306 306 
R-squared 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
                                                
24 As robustness tests, we rerun the regressions using, to capture the difference in risk preferences, the variable safe, the 
number of safe choices a subject made, instead of the dummy Somewhat_versus_highly_risk_averse. With the variable 
safe, the significance is overall lower: the relationship for Dictator giving in Model 1 stays significant (p < 0.042), but not 
in Model 2 (p < 0.311).  




The models 1D1 and 1U1 test the hypotheses 1D and 1U with the simplest specifications.  
In addition, we run regressions including the socio-demographic variables (models 1D2 and 1U2), and 
we also run—as robustness tests—regressions with interaction dummies to test if there is a significant 
interaction between endowment risk and risk aversion (models 1D3, 1D4, 1U3 and 1U4). 
Model 1D1 provides support for hypothesis 1D: subjects with relatively high risk aversion give 
significantly (p < 0.01) more in the Dictator game.25 Model 1D2 shows that the effect is robust to the 
inclusion of the socio-demographic variables: the effect stays statistically significant (p < 0.09), albeit 
at a lower level of significance. Models 1D3 and 1D4 show that the interaction dummies, which have 
coefficients that are not significantly different from zero, do not affect the results. 
Model 1U1 does not provide support for hypothesis 1U: while subjects with relatively high risk 
aversion set, in line with hypothesis 1U, higher thresholds in the Ultimatum game compared to those 
with relatively low risk aversion, the effect is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, endowment 
risk has a highly significant effect (p < 0.01) on the threshold level set in the Ultimatum game: an 
increase in endowment risk increases the threshold level. Model 1U3 shows that this effect occurs 
mostly independent of risk preferences: the effect of endowment risk on threshold remains significant 
(p = 0.07), albeit at a lower level of significance, in the presence of the interaction dummies that 
capture the interaction effects between endowment risk and risk aversion. 
At first glance, there appears to be a subject-pool effect in Model 1D1, as City Hall employees tend 
to give significantly (p = 0.06) more in the Dictator game. Model 1D2 shows, however, that the 
subject-pool effect becomes insignificant when social-economic variables are included in the 
regression. In Model 1D2, the socio-economic variable Time_to_answer (the comprehension questions), 
which is possibly an indication of cognitive ability, is positive and significant (p < 0.01). We note that 
the coefficient of determination is quite low for all regressions in Table 6. 
Even though, as mentioned, we cannot derive theoretical predictions for giving in the Ultimatum 
game, we ran a regression of Ultimatum giving on the same variables as in Table 6 and we found that 
Ultimatum giving does not depend on risk aversion. 
4.2. Consistency within Games (Hypothesis 2: Increasing Endowment Risk does not have a  
Significant Effect) 
Since we can only test hypotheses 2D and 2U by including somewhat risk-averse (but not  
risk-loving) subjects and very risk-averse (but not highly risk-averse) subjects, the number of 
observations is relatively small. In particular, we had to exclude not only inconsistent subjects, whose 
risk preference cannot be measured with sufficient precision to test hypothesis 1 and 2, but also highly 
risk-averse (5 safe choices) and risk-loving (0 safe choices) subjects, as they are not within the domain 
of hypothesis 2.26 
                                                
25 Running a Tobit regression, to account for the left-censoring of Dictator giving, gives the same significance levels for 
Models 1D1 and 1D3, and slightly higher ones for Models 1D2 and 1D4. 
26 Note that subjects with one safe choice include subjects who lean towards being somewhat risk-averse (0.86 < r < 1), 
subjects who are risk-neutral (r = 1), and subjects who lean towards being risk-loving (1 < r < 1.15); see Table 4. Since 
theory predicts that an increase in risk aversion has an effect for risk-loving subjects (decrease giving) that is opposite to 
that for risk-averse subjects (increase giving), the inclusion of these subjects should lead us to underestimate the increase in 
giving. However, effects on giving are very small round the point where risk-loving changes to risk aversion (r = 1), and 




To measure the effect of endowment risk, we include a dummy variable High_endowment_risk for 
testing hypothesis 2D and dummy variables High_endowment_risk and Low_endowment_risk for 
testing hypothesis 2U. Note also that the baseline is “low risk” in the Dictator game and “no risk” in 
the Ultimatum game. 
Model 2D1 and 2U1 test the hypotheses with the simplest specifications. We also run regressions 
including the socio-demographic variables (models 2D2 and 2U2), and for hypothesis 2D we also 
run—as robustness tests—Tobit regressions (models 2D3 and 2D4) since many subjects made a 
choice of zero in the Dictator game. 
Supporting hypothesis 2D, model 2D1 shows that the dummy for high-endowment risk is not 
statistically significant. The dummy for high-endowment risk is also insignificant in Model 2D2 
(including the socio-demographic variables) and in models 2D3 and 2D4 (the robustness tests using 
Tobit regressions). Hypothesis 2D is thus supported by our data. 
Contradicting hypothesis 2U, model 2U1 shows that both dummies for high-endowment risk 
(p < 0.01) and low-endowment risk (p = 0.07) are statistically significant.27 This suggests that 
participants with typical risk-aversion preferences set significantly higher thresholds under risk than 
under certainty. Model 2U2 shows that including socio-demographic variables does not change the 
results. Hypothesis 2U is thus not supported by our data. 
Table 7. Linear regression of giving on risk aversion and endowment risk in the Dictator 
and Ultimatum games (with clustered errors). 













High_endowment_risk  −0.83 −0.83 −0.92 −0.93 4.78*** 4.78*** 
 (1.96) (2.02) (2.52) (2.50) (1.65) (1.68) 
Low_endowment_risk     3.18* 3.18* 
     (1.73) (1.76) 
Income  1.16  2.09  −2.05 
  (1.17)  (1.42)  (1.55) 
Age  −0.49  −0.86  −0.08 
  (0.43)  (0.59)  (0.54) 
Female  5.32  9.48  −1.20 
  (5.88)  (7.71)  (6.69) 
Time_to_answer  2.06**  2.95**  0.55 
  (0.89)  (1.25)  (1.36) 
City_Hall_employees  14.90* 2.19 18.80* −3.74 −4.21 16.33 
 (7.99) (12.07) (9.62) (15.63) (8.58) (17.12) 
CTUR  −3.53 −10.71 −8.78 −20.01 −1.88 −1.23 
 (7.14) (7.88) (12.71) (13.97) (6.80) (7.80) 
Constant 15.59*** 15.67 10.04* 12.45 24.47*** 30.28* 
 (3.22) (10.53) (5.18) (13.50) (3.86) (15.00) 
                                                                                                                                                                
we can thus expect that the resulting underestimation will be small. Indeed, running a regression excluding also the 
subjects with 1 safe choice does not change the results qualitatively. 
27 An F-test shows that the dummies for high and low endowment risk are not significantly different (p = 0.42). 




Table 7. Cont. 













N 80 80 80 80 120 120 
(Independent clusters) (40) (40) (40) (40) 60 60 
R-squared 
(pseudo R-squared) 
0.11 0.22 (0.02) (0.04) 0.02 0.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
As in the regressions for testing hypothesis 1, there appears to be a subject-pool effect in Model 
2D1 and 2D3, as City Hall employees tend to set significantly higher thresholds (p = 0.07) in the 
Ultimatum game. As in testing hypothesis 1, when social-economic variables are included in the 
regression (see Models 2D2 and 2D4), the subject-pool effect becomes insignificant and the variable 
Time_to_answer (the comprehension questions) becomes positive and significant (p = 0.03). We note 
that the coefficient of determination is quite low for all regressions in Table 7. 
4.3. Consistency across Games (Hypothesis 3: Subjects Are Consistent between Games) 
We used Equation (6) and subjects’ threshold choices in the Ultimatum game to derive prediction 
intervals from the observed threshold choices in the Ultimatum game for their giving choices in the 
Dictator game, and vice versa. This is a test of consistency between the two games on the individual 
level. Table 8 shows that subjects do not make consistent choices in the two games: the percentages of 
successful prediction are very low. Only 10% of the responses observed are within the predicted 
interval. 28  We conclude that subjects are not consistent across games when measured on the  
individual level. 
Table 8. Observed and predicted data on the individual level. 
 Successful Unsuccessful Total 













                                                
28 The success percentages are symmetric by design. The analysis in Table 8 excluded the 14 responses where the choice 
for the Ultimatum threshold predicted Dictator taking (giving a negative amount, which was not a possible choice in the 
experiment). Including these 14 responses, and accepting the closest possible Dictator giving choice, zero, as a correct 
prediction, increases the correct percentage of predictions somewhat, from the 10% reported in Table 8 to 20%. 




Figure 2. Observed and predicted data on the aggregate level. 





















































We also examined how well the ERC formulation predicts aggregate behavior. Figure 2 compares 
the predicted and observed choices for Dictator giving and Ultimatum thresholds, aggregated over all 
consistent subjects for both levels of endowment risk (low and high). Using the two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we reject the hypothesis that the observed and predicted distributions are 
the same for the Dictator game and the Ultimatum game (p < 0.001). The predicted distributions are 
thus poor approximations for the aggregate observed choices. Predictions at the aggregate level by and 
far fail. On the whole, this implies that subjects’ behavior is not consistent across games, on both the 
individual level or on the aggregate level. These findings are only partially in line with Blanco et al. [20], 
who found that behavior measured at the individual level was not consistent, but behavior measured at 
the aggregate level was fairly consistent. Our predictions were, however, more fine-grained than those 
in Blanco et al. [20]. They were thus subjected to a stricter, more demanding test for consistency. We 
also note that our findings are based on specification of the extended ERC formula. It is therefore 
possible that other specifications fare better (or worse). Our specification is, however, one of the 
simplest ways to implement constant risk-averse preferences. Better specifications would have more 
complicated forms. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
Summarizing the results, Hypothesis 1D and 2D are supported. Specifically, those who are more 
risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in the Dictator game (1D). Though the sign is correct for 
the Ultimatum game responder (IU), it is not significant, possibly because the number of observations 
was too low. This tentatively supports our first hypothesis, that those with higher risk aversion are 
more inequality-averse (and thus possess a stronger preference for fairness) than those with lower risk 




aversion. Our finding that more risk-averse people tend to be more inequality-averse is roughly in line 
with the results in Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos [3] and Carlsson et al. [4] who used survey data  
and non-incentivized choices between imagined societies and lotteries. Our somewhat weaker results 
may reflect the fact that findings of inequality aversion are likely to be susceptible to “price” 
sensitivity, i.e., it is not difficult to be inequality-averse when there are no monetary consequences to 
making decisions. 
Using the predictions derived from ERC theory, as implemented by a simple constant-relative-risk-
aversion utility function (2), we find that endowment risk has no effect on giving in the Dictator game, 
confirming hypothesis 2D. Endowment risk does have a significant positive effect on the acceptance 
threshold in the Ultimatum game, contradicting hypothesis 2U. The effect, an increase in endowment 
risk leading to an increase in threshold, is in line with the prediction, but the size of the effect is much 
larger than predicted. This indicates that risk, which is not an ingredient of ERC theory, may affect 
acceptance thresholds in Ultimatum games. 
We can thus conclude that the data corroborate the predictions from specification of the extended 
ERC formula for the Dictator game (1D and 2D), but not for the Ultimatum game (1U and 2U). We 
find that subjects are not consistent across games at the individual level, which contradicts hypothesis 
3 but is consistent with the results of Blanco et al. [20]. At the aggregate level, we found that 
responses were not consistent across games, which is not in line with the results of Blanco et al. [20].  
It is important to recall that people make inconsistent choices as viewed from the perspective of the 
theory that we use. One might conjecture that the functional form we used to incorporate risk 
preferences in the ERC formula may not be appropriate for the Dictator or Ultimatum game. The fact 
that our test of the effect of endowment risk on subject behavior, Hypothesis 2, is confirmed for the 
Dictator game, but contradicted for the Ultimatum game, suggests that the functional form we used 
may be appropriate for the Dictator game, but not for the Ultimatum game. We note that our test 
predicting the responses in one game from those in the other game is rather demanding test. These 
predictions are conditional on the risk preferences, which have been derived from our variant of the 
Holt & Laury [5] instrument. Basically, consistent choices in Hypothesis 3 thus require that the 
choices in three decision situations are consistent. That said, we know from other studies (like the one 
by Blanco et al. [20]) that others also have found that subjects make inconsistent choices. 
Our data thus give tentative support to the claim that there is a positive relationship between  
risk aversion and fairness considerations. Our data also suggests that ERC theory, as formulated, does 
not seem particularly well suited to account for the effects of risk in the environment and risk 
preferences across the Dictator and Ultimatum games. The ERC formulation seems to fare better for 
the Dictator game.  
We tested our theoretical predictions experimentally on two different subject pools: students of 
Czech Technical University—a subject pool we have drawn on previously that produced behavior in 
line with the behavior of student subjects elsewhere [33]—and employees of Prague City Hall. We 
generally did not find significant differences between the two groups, except for the regression of 
Dictator giving which indicated that employees of Prague City Hall give more in the Dictator game. 
This effect, however, is insignificant once socio-economic variables are incorporated in the regression. 
We included sessions where students were presented with the decision problems in a different order to 
control for order effects. These students show somewhat different responses on some of the variables 




of interest, indicating that order effects may play a role in the results of this study. The indicator 
variable for sessions with these students is, however, not significant in any of our tests, suggesting that 
order effects play a minor role in the results.  
To summarize, we find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in 
the Dictator game in that they give more. We believe this finding is novel. We find a similar result for 
the Ultimatum game but that result is statistically not significant; (2) Using the within-subject feature 
of our design, and in line with our theoretical prediction, varying risk does not influence behavior in 
the Dictator game, but does so in the Ultimatum game; (3) Using the within-subject feature of our 
design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions across games; this is true on the level of 
individuals (confirming the findings in Blanco et al. [20]) as well as in the aggregate (contradicting the 
findings in Blanco et al. [20]); (4) There are no subject-pool differences once we control for the 
elicited risk attitude and demographic variables that we collect.  
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Appendix 
A.1. Overview of Responses on the Holt-Laury Test 
Table A1. The patterns of answers on the Holt-Laury test and the risk-aversion interval. 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Interval Risk aversion Occurrence 
Subjects that were consistent in their choices 
RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY [1.15;  +∞] Risk-loving 9% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY [0.86;  1.15] Risk-neutral 4% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY [0.60;  0.86] Somewhat Risk-averse 4% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  0.60] Intermediately Risk-averse 4% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY [0.04;  0.33] Very Risk-averse 9% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; 0.04] Highly Riskaverse 24% 
Subjects that had fat risk aversion intervals 
SAFE RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 1% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY [0.04;  1.15] Undeterminable 2% 
SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; 1.15] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  0.86] Undeterminable 3% 
SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; 0.86] Undeterminable 1% 
SAFE SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; 0.60] Undeterminable 2% 
RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33;  +∞] Undeterminable 3% 
RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE RISKY [0.04;  +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY RISKY [0.33 ;  +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
Subjects that made contradictory choices 
RISKY RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 3% 
RISKY RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 4% 
RISKY RISKY SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 




Table A1. Cont. 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Interval Risk aversion Occurrence 
Subjects that made contradictory choices 
RISKY SAFE RISKY RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE RISKY SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE SAFE RISKY SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 1% 
RISKY SAFE SAFE SAFE SAFE [−∞; +∞] Undeterminable 7% 
A.2. Overview of the Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Subjects  
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of our two subject pools conditional on the socio-demographic 
variables.  
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Figure A.1.  Cont. 
e. Risk Preferences 




















Graphs by relCH  
As shown in the histograms, the socio-demographic characteristics differ markedly across the two 
subject pools, though there is also considerable overlap. In Figure A.1.e, we show the number of safe 
choices in the risk-attitude assessment task. The number of safe choices in tandem with Table 4 allows 
us to determine a subject’s degree of risk aversion. 
A.3. Simulations on the Effect of Risk in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games on Decisions 
Figure A.2. Effect of risk on giving in the Dictator game. 
Risk 
aversion 
Column 1: Low risk 
(S = 900 or S = 1100 with equal 
likelihood) 
Column 2: High risk 
(S = 300 or S = 1700 with 
equal likelihood) 
Column 3: Difference in optimal 
giving p between High and Low 
risk 
r = −0.14 
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Figure A.2. Cont. 
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On the vertical axes is the proportion of giving p; On the horizontal axes is the inequality aversion parameter k. 
Figure A.2 shows giving in the Dictator game as a function of the inequality aversion parameter k 
and the risk aversion parameter r for our formulation of the ERC model.29 The relationship is shown 
for the low-risk condition in the first column and for the high-risk condition in the second one. The 
third column shows the difference between the two graphs, which shows that the absolute difference is 
never larger than 0.03 for risk-averse subjects, and is never larger than 0.025 for risk-loving subjects. 
These differences are very small, and moreover, they are maxima over all possible inequality aversion 
parameters for the five degrees of risk aversion we consider. For example, differences are predicted to 
be no larger than 0.0043 for very risk-averse subjects (r = 0.04) and no larger than zero for highly  
risk-averse subjects (r = −0.14). We thus expect that risk will not affect dictator giving in  
the experiment. 
Figure A.3 shows acceptance thresholds in the Ultimatum game as a function of the inequality 
aversion parameter k and the risk aversion parameter r for our formulation of the ERC model. The 
relationship is shown for the no-risk condition in the first column, for the low-risk condition in the 
second one, and for the high-risk condition in the third one. The fourth column shows the difference 
between the high-risk and the no-risk graphs (as they are the most different), and shows that for  
risk-loving subjects, the absolute difference is never larger than 0.004. The difference is never larger 
than 0.009 for somewhat risk-averse preferences. For very and highly risk-averse subjects, the 
difference can be substantial—up to almost 0.5. This is the result of a sudden switchover in the 
threshold from zero to close to 0.5 when the inequality aversion parameter k passes a certain value. 
                                                
29 For each of the levels of risk aversion we studied, we created a grid of values for the inequality aversion parameter k and, 
using formula (4), calculated the optimal giving for each of the values of k, given the level of risk aversion and the level of 
risk. We use these coordinates to draw the figures in Figure A.2. We used a likewise procedure, using formula (4’) for 
drawing the figures in Figure A.3 for the Ultimatum games. We programmed the algorithms in Mathematica. 




With larger risk, the switchover occurs at a slightly higher k, thus resulting in a large difference. This 
difference is, however, predicted to exist only for a very narrow range of the inequality aversion 
parameter k. Over all values of k that are outside of this very narrow range, the difference is virtually 
zero. We thus expect that risk will not affect the acceptance thresholds set in the experiment. 
Figure A.3. Effect of risk on acceptance threshold in the Ultimatum game. 
Risk 
aversion 
Column 1: No risk 
(S = 1000 with certainty) 
Column 2: Low risk 
(S = 900 or S = 1100 
with equal likelihood) 
Column 3: High risk 
(S = 300 or S = 1700 
with equal likelihood) 
Column 4: Difference in 
optimal giving p between 
High and No risk 
r = −0.14 
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On the vertical axes is the proportion of giving p; On the horizontal axes is the inequality aversion parameter k. 
A.4. Prediction Errors on the Individual Level 
Taking into account that subjects may have made errors in their choices, we look at the size of the 
error between the observed choices and the prediction interval. 




Figure A.4. Prediction error. 
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Figure A.4. shows that the overall prediction error is high both for Dictator giving and Ultimatum 
thresholds. The first bar in the histogram in Figure A.4.a accounts for all predictions of Dictator giving 
that have an error equal to 10 percentage points or less. It can be read from the vertical axis that these 
responses account for 25% of the total responses in the Dictator game. The first and second bar 
together account for all predictions that have an error equal to 20 percentage points or less: together 
they account for less than 40% of all responses in the Dictator game. Likewise, Figure A.4.b shows 
that the predictions for Ultimatum thresholds that have an error equal to 10 percentage points or less 
account for 25% of all responses and those that have an error equal to 20 percentage points or less 
account for 40% of all responses. The prediction error is thus considerable. We conclude that subjects 
are far from consistent across games when measured on the individual level. 
A.5. Scripted Instructions  
Welcome! You are about to participate in an economics experiment. You will be asked to make a 
series of decisions. Your decisions will have payoff consequences that will also depend on other 
participants’ decisions. You will be paid privately in cash immediately after the experiment is over. 
You will get 1 CZK for each 20 ECU (experimental currency units) that you earn during the experiment. 
We ask that from now on you refrain from any communication, whether verbal or nonverbal, with 
other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you. 
Throughout the experiment you will, for every single decision (where applicable), be matched 
randomly with one other participant. The probability that you will be matched with the same 
participant for more decisions is therefore rather low. 
All in all you will be asked to make 17 decisions. You will be informed about the payoff 
consequences of any of these decisions only after your have made your last decision. 
[Any questions?] 
During the experiment we will use the following three basic scenarios (labeled One, Two, and 
Three). The computer is instructed to match you randomly with some other participant of the 
experiment in each of these three scenarios (for every decision you will get a new match). You will 




also be asked about your preferences (Scenario Four). In this Scenario your payoff cannot be affected 
by the decision of another participant. 
Scenario One involves a pie of size S that is being divided between two participants that we call 
Participant A and Participant B. Task of Participant A is to split the pie of size S in any way he or she 
sees fit. Participant B is the recipient of what Participant A allocates; he or she will not make any 
decision in this scenario. Participant A will be asked to state her or his decision as a number between 0 
and 100, i.e., as a percentage of pie size S that he or she allocates to Participant B. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Two involves a pie of size S that is being divided between two participants which we call 
Participant C and Participant D. Task of Participant C is to split the pie of size S in any way he or she 
sees fit. But now Participant D may either accept the offer or reject it. Participant C will be asked to 
state her or his decision of how to split the pie as a number between 0 and 100 (the “offer”), 
representing a percentage of pie size S that he or she offers to Participant D. Participant D will also be 
asked to state her or his decision whether he or she accepts the offer in a similar way as a number 
between 0 and 100 (the “acceptance threshold”) representing the minimal offer for which Participant 
D will not reject the offer. If the acceptance threshold of Participant D is higher than the offer that 
Participant C made, then the offer is not accepted, and both participants will be paid nothing for this 
scenario. Otherwise, they will be paid in accordance with the split that Participant C proposed. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Three involves Participants E and F. Participant E is endowed with 500 ECU out of which 
he or she can send any amount of his or her choice (from 0 to 500 ECU) to Participant F (the rest of 
the 500 ECU endowment stays on the account of Participant E). The amount sent to Participant F will 
be multiplied by a factor X before it reaches Participant F. It is then task of Participant F to split the 
amount received (i.e., X times the amount sent) in any way he or she sees fit. Participant E is the 
recipient of what Participant F allocates. 
[Any questions?] 
Scenario Four. The computer assigned to you at the beginning of the experiment a natural number 
N from 1 to 100 (any number 1, 2, 3, …, 100 is equally likely). This number will be revealed to you 
only at the end of the experiment. You will have to choose one of the two options “+” or “*”. On the 
screen, you have to fill a blank box with your choice of “+” or “*” and then press the “OK” button. 
Once you have pressed the “OK” button, you will not be able to go back. The computer is 
programmed to randomly select one of five such decisions you made during the whole experiment at 
the end of the experiment. For this purpose, the program uses a generator of random numbers. 
Choosing any of the five decisions in Scenario Four is equally likely. You will be paid at the end 
according to your choice in the selected decision and your personal N. (Note that in Scenario Four you 
do not interact with any other player.) 
Example: choice +: 1000 ECU if N>40, 1250 ECU otherwise 
or *: 60 ECU if N>40, 2400 ECU otherwise 
(note that numbers will vary across decisions) 
[Any questions?] 
[Please turn your attention now to the computer screen but keep these hard copy instructions readily 
accessible.] 




Thank you for participating in the experiment. 
A.6. Sequencing of decisions 
The sequencing of the decisions was the same for all participants, except those in sessions 9 and 10; 
see footnote 6 for an explanation: 
Decision 1: Ultimatum proposal with no risk (pie size 1000) 
Decision 2: Risk attitude measurement (n>40, i.e., Choice 1) 
Decision 3: Dictator with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 4: Trust game sending with high risk (factor 1.2 or 2.8) 
Decision 5: Ultimatum proposal with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 6: Risk attitude measurement (n>50, i.e., Choice 2) 
Decision 7: Ultimatum threshold with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 8: Trust game sending with low risk (factor 1.8 or 2.2) 
Decision 9: Ultimatum proposal with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 10: Risk attitude measurement (n>60, i.e., Choice 3) 
Decision 11: Ultimatum threshold with low risk (pie size 900 or 1100) 
Decision 12: Risk attitude measurement (n>70, i.e., Choice 4) 
Decision 13: Dictator with high risk (pie size 300 or 1700) 
Decision 14: Ultimatum threshold with no risk (pie size 1000) 
Decision 15: Trust game return with high risk (factor 1.2 or 2.8) 
Decision 16: Risk attitude measurement (n>80, i.e., Choice 5) 
Decision 17: Trust game return with low risk (factor 1.8 or 2.2)  
A.7. Control Questions 
Consider scenario One with the total amount of S=200 ECU. You have the role of participant A and 
you made a choice of 84.  
• Question 1: What are your earnings from this scenario?  
• Question 2: What are the earnings of participant B, who has been selected randomly and 
assigned to you for this scenario. Please fill out your answer in the space above and confirm. 
A.8. Instructions in the z-Tree Program 
In the z-Tree program, participants were given instructions and referred to the printed instructions 
to guide their understanding of the decision tasks. In Table A.2 below, we give the full instructions as 
they appeared in the z-Tree program. In the left column are the original Czech instructions and in the 
right column the corresponding English translations. Each part starts with a code in brackets [], that 
identifies the task (Dictator, Ultimatum or Trust game or Holt-Laury task), the role for the participant 
(Proposer or Respondent role) and the degree of risk in the task (none, low, or high). The code in 
brackets was not presented to the participants. 
 
 





D = Dictator Scenario  P = Proposer role  none = no-risk condition 
U = Ultimatum Game   R = Respondent role  low = low-risk condition 
T = Trust Game       high = high-risk condition 
HL= Holt-Laury task 
Table A.2. Instructions in the z-Tree program. 
Original (Czech) English translation 
[Questionnaire] 
Nyni overime, ze vsichni porozumeli zakladnim 
scenarum, ktere popisuji instrukce. 
Odpovedi na nasledujici dve otazky nebudou mit 
dopad na Vasi vyplatu z experimentu, ale 
pokracovat budete moci jen po jejich spravnem 
zodpovezeni. 
Mate-li otazku, zvednete ruku a experimentator 
Vam prijde odpovedet. 
Uvazujte scenar Jedna s celkovou castkou S=200 
ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a sve rozhodnuti jste 
vyjadril cislem 84. 
Otazka 1: Kolik je Vas zisk z pouziti tohoto 
scenare? 
Otazka 2: Kolik je zisk ucastnika B, ktery k Vam 
byl pro pouziti tohoto scenare nahodne prirazen? 
Vase odpovedi prosim vyplnte v jednotkach ECU 
do okenek vyse a potvrdte! 
[Questionnaire] 
We will now ensure that everybody understood 
the basic scenarios from the instructions. 
Your answers on the two following questions will 
not have any effect on your earnings from the 
experiment, but you will be able to continue only 
after you have answered them correctly  
If you have an answer, please raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come. 
Consider scenario One with the total S=200 ECU 
 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
You have the role of participant A and you made 
a choice of 84.  
Question 1: What are your earnings from this 
scenario?  
Question 2: What are the earnings of participant 
B, who has been selected randomly and assigned 
to you for this scenario? Please fill out your 
answer in ECUs in the space above and confirm! 
[U_P-none] 
Od nynejska budou mit vsechna Vase rozhodnuti 
dusledky na vysi Vasi vyplaty z tohoto 
experimentu. 
Proto davejte dobry pozor na ukoly, o ktere Vas 
budeme zadat. 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva s celkovou castkou S= 1000 
ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 1: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_P-none] 
From now on, all your decisions will affect your 
earnings from this experiment. 
Therefore, pay close attention to the tasks we will 
present to you.  
Consider Scenario Two with the total S=200 
ECU 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
 
You have the role of participant C and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 1: What is your proposal? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 




Table A.2. Cont. 
[HL-40] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>40, jinak 
ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>40, jinak 
ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 2: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-40] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when N>40, 
otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when N>40, 
otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 2: What choice do you prefer? 
[D] 
Nyni uvazujte scenar Jedna. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 3: Jake je Vase rozhodnuti, kolik 
procent prevest? 
[D] 
Now consider Scenario One. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either S=900 ECU or S=1100 
ECU. 
You have the role of participant A and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 3: What is your decision, how much as a 
percentage will you transfer? 
[T_P] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.2 nebo X=2.8. 
Jste v roli ucastnika E a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 4: Kolik ECU posilate ucastnikovi F? 
[T_P] 
Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.2 or X=2.8. 
You have the role of participant E and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 4: How much ECU will you send to 
participant F? 
[U_P-high] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 5: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_P-high] 
Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either 
S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant C and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 5: What is your proposal? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 




Table A.2. Cont. 
[HL-50] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>50, jinak 
ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>50, jinak 
ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 6: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-50] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when N>50, 
otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when N>50, 
otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 6: What choice do you prefer? 
[U_R-high] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 7: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_R-high] 
Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either 
S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant D and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 7: What is your proposal? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 
[T_P-high] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.8 nebo X=2.2. 
Jste v roli ucastnika E a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 8: Kolik ECU posilate ucastnikovi F? 
[T_P-high] 
Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.8 or X=2.2. 
You have the role of participant E and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 8: How much ECU will you send to 
participant F? 
[U_P-low] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika C a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 9: Jaka je Vase nabidka? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_P-low] 
Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either 
S=900 ECU or S=1100 ECU. 
You have the role of participant C and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 9: What is your proposal? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 
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[HL-60] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>60, jinak 
ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>60, jinak 
ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 10: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-60] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when N>60, 
otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when N>60, 
otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 10: What choice do you prefer? 
[U_R-low] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=900 ECU nebo S=1100 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 11: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_R-low] 
Consider Scenario Two. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either 
S=900 ECU or S=1100 ECU. 
You have the role of participant D and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 11: What is your acceptance threshold? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 
[HL-70] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>70, jinak 
ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>70, jinak 
ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 12: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-70] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when N>70, 
otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when N>70, 
otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
Decision 12: What choice do you prefer? 
[D-high] 
Nyni uvazujte scenar Jedna. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Celkova castka S je nahodna a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
S=300 ECU nebo S=1700 ECU. 
Jste v roli ucastnika A a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 13: Jake je Vase rozhodnuti, kolik 
procent prevest? 
[D-high] 
Now consider Scenario One. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
The total amount S is random and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either 
 S=300 ECU or S=1700 ECU. 
You have the role of participant A and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 13: What is your decision, how much as 
a percentage will you transfer? 
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[U_R-none] 
Uvazujte Scenar Dva s celkovou castkou S= 1000 
ECU. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Jste v roli ucastnika D a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Rozhodnuti 14: Jaky je Vas prah 
akceptovatelnosti? 
Prosim vyplnte Vasi odpoved do okenka a 
potvrdte! 
[U_R-none] 
Consider Scenario Two. With the amount S=1000 
ECU. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
You have the role of participant D and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
Decision 14: What is your acceptance threshold? 
Please fill out your answer in the space above and 
confirm! 
[T_R-high] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.2 nebo X=2.8. 
Jste v roli ucastnika F a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Obdrzel jste castku ECU 
(to je X krat mnozstvi poslane ucastnikem E, 
ktery k Vam byl pro toto rozhodnuti nahodne 
prirazen.) 
Rozhodnuti 15: Kolik ECU prevadite zpet na 
ucastnika E? 
[T_R-high] 
Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.2 or X=2.8. 
You have the role of participant F and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
You received the amount ECU: … 
(this is X times the amount send by the 
participant E, who was for this decision randomly 
assigned to you.) 
Decision 15: How much ECU will you send back 
to participant E? 
[HL-80] 
Uvazujte scenar Ctyri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Volba "+": Ziskate 1000 ECU pokud N>80, jinak 
ziskate 1250 ECU 
Volba "*": Ziskate 60 ECU pokud N>80, jinak 
ziskate 2400 ECU 
Rozhodnuti 16: Kterou volbu preferujete? 
[HL-80] 
Consider scenario Four 
 (If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Choice “+”: You receive 1000 ECU when N>80, 
otherwise you receive 1250 ECU 
Choice “*”: You receive 60 ECU when N>80, 
otherwise you receive 2400 ECU 
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[T_R-low] 
Uvazujte nyni scenar Tri. 
(Pokud potrebujete, vratte se k tistenym 
instrukcim, ktere tento scenar popisuji.) 
Faktor X je nahodne cislo a se stejnou 
pravdepodobnosti je bud 
X=1.8 nebo X=2.2. 
Jste v roli ucastnika F a pro ucely scenare jste byl 
pocitacem nahodne prirazen k jinemu ucastnikovi 
experimentu. 
Obdrzel jste castku ECU 
(to je X krat mnozstvi poslane ucastnikem E, 
ktery k Vam byl pro toto rozhodnuti nahodne 
prirazen.) 
Rozhodnuti 17: Kolik ECU prevadite zpet na 
ucastnika E? 
[T_R-low] 
 Consider Scenario Three. 
(If you need to, you may return to the written 
instruction that describes this scenario)  
Factor X is a random number and is, with equal 
likelihood, equal to either  
X=1.8 or X=2.2. 
You have the role of participant F and for this 
scenario you have been randomly assigned to 
another participant in this experiment. 
You received the amount ECU: … 
(this is X times the amount send by the 
participant E, who was for this decision randomly 
assigned to you.) 
Decision 17: How much ECU will you send back 
to participant E? 
[Demographics] 
Zatimco my a pocitacovy program urcujeme 
celkove vydelky z dnesniho experimentu, 
prosime Vas odpovedet na nekolik otazek o Vas. 
Vsechna data budou povazovana za prisne 
duverna a budou pouzita pouze pro tuto studii. 
Po vyplneni a az Vas experimentator pozada, 
predstupujte jednotlive s Vasim obcanskym 
prukazem (pripadne jinou ID kartou) k vyplate. 
- Vase rodne cislo 
- -Kolik je Vas mesicni disponibilni 
prijem (to je, kolik penez muzete 
utratit pote, co zaplatite za sve 
ubytovani)? 
[Demographics] 
While we an the computer program are 
calculating the total earnings from todays 
experiment, we would like to ask you to answer 
some questions. 
All data will be considered as strictly confidential 
a will be used only for this study. After you have 
filled out the questionnaire and once the 
experimenter ask you to, please come one by one 
to the pay desk with your identity card (or with 
another form of ID). 
- Your birth number 
- How much is your monthly disposable 
income (that is, how much can you 
spend after you have paid for 
lodging?) 
[Results] 
Vase N bylo 
Z rozhodnuti 2,6,10,12,16 bylo nahodne vybrano 
rozhodnuti 
Z toho rozhodnuti Vas vydelek cinil ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 1 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 3 jste vydelal ECU 
V roli ucastnika B jste z rozhodnuti 3 Vam 
nahodne prirazeneho ucastnika A vydelal ECU 
 
Z rozhodnuti 4 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 5 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 7 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 8 jste vydelal ECU 
[Results] 
Your N was 
From decisions 2, 6, 10, 12, 16 has been 
randomly chosen decision: … 
From this decision you earning is in ECU: … 
From decision 1 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 3 you earned in ECU: … 
In the role of participant B, you have for decision 
3 received from a randomly assigned participant 
A in ECU: … 
From decision 4 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 5 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 7 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 8 you earned in ECU: … 




Z rozhodnuti 9 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 11 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 13 jste vydelal ECU 
V roli ucastnika B jste z rozhodnuti 13 Vam 
nahodne prirazeneho ucastnika A vydelal ECU 
 
Z rozhodnuti 14 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 15 jste vydelal ECU 
Z rozhodnuti 17 jste vydelal ECU 
From decision 9 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 11 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 13 you earned in ECU: … 
In the role of participant B, you have for decision 
3 received from a randomly assigned participant 
A in ECU: … 
From decision 14 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 15 you earned in ECU: … 
From decision 17 you earned in ECU: … 
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